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INTRODUCTION
Justice Abraham Fortas wrote in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District' that students and teachers do not "shed their
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-
house gate." 2 In contrast to Justice Fortas' broad promise of rights in
Tinker, the Third Circuit has stated that "a school's authority to con-
trol student speech in an elementary school setting is undoubtedly
greater than in a high school setting."3 Recent cases involving
younger students have highlighted this debate over the extent of
younger citizens' rights: That is, at which "schoolhouse gate" do these
rights begin? Further complicating the issue of the extent of younger
students' rights is the lack of guidance by the Supreme Court and
disagreement in the lower courts over whether courts should evaluate
elementary speech cases in the same manner as other student speech
cases. 4 Finally, an added complication: nearly all of the student
speech cases involving elementary children involve religious speech.
Part I of this Note examines the background to religious free
speech in schools, including the Supreme Court's failure to articulate
a separate standard for elementary schools and circuit and district
1 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
2 Id. at 506.
3 S.G. ex rel. A.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417, 423 (3d Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004) (mem.).
4 See Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 416 (3d Cir. 2003)
("The significance of age in this inquiry has called into question the appropriateness of
employing the Tinker framework to assess the constitutionality of restrictions on the expres-
sion of elementary school students. No other Court of Appeals has ruled on the applicabil-
ity of Tinker in this context." (footnote omitted)); Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson
Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Tinker and its progeny dealt princi-
pally with older students for whom adulthood and full citizenship were fast approaching.
The Court has not suggested that fourth-graders have the free expression rights of high
school students." (citing Baxter ex rel. Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728,
737-38 (7th Cir. 1994))), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1156 (1997) (mem.); Baxter exrel. Baxter v.
Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 730, 738 (7th Cir. 1994) (involving expressive, but
not religious, t-shirts worn by an elementary school student and holding that Tinker was
inapplicable to elementary school students, partially basing its decision to affirm a denial
of speech rights on the "dearth of case law" governing elementary school free speech),
superseded on other grounds by statute, 12 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 19/1-21 (West 2005) as recog-
nized in Holmes v. Marion County Office of Family & Children, 349 F.3d 914 (7th Cir.
2003); see also Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 541 U.S. 936 (2004)
(mem.) (denying certiorari on appeal from the Third Circuit in the most recent elemen-
tary school religious speech case).
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court approaches to religious free speech in elementary schools. Part
II explains why age is an important consideration, and further, how
courts should factor age into the analysis of religious free speech
cases. Part III evaluates possible standards that could be applied: an
extension of Tinker, a reliance on other factors considered by lower
courts in elementary speech cases, including the extent of younger
students' rights, intersecting constitutional considerations, including
the Establishment Clause, public forum analysis, and the constitution-
ality of viewpoint discrimination in the school setting, and situation-
specific factors, such as the type of speech and possibility of coercion;
or a discretionary standard. Part III then argues that because of the
dramatically different nature of the elementary school classroom, the
Supreme Court should not merely extend its Tinker analysis, but
should adopt a standard that gives a substantial amount of discretion
to education professionals while still protecting student speech.
I
LEGAL BACKGROUND OF STUDENTS' FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
A. Free Speech in Secondary Schools
1. Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District: The Supreme Court Standard
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District is the
seminal student free speech case and the starting point for the consti-
tutional evaluation of speech that takes place in public schools. 5 In
Tinker, two high school students, Christopher Eckhardt and John
Tinker, and a junior high school student, Mary Beth Tinker, wore
black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War-and in vio-
lation of school policy. 6 School officials suspended the students for
refusing to remove the armbands, and the students filed suit, claiming
a violation of their constitutional rights.
7
After reviewing the case, the Supreme Court held that the school
officials denied the students the right to freedom of expression.8 Sig-
5 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Students Do Leave Their First Amendment Rights at the School-
house Gates: What's Left ofTinker?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 527, 527 (2000).
6 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. Regrettably, two of John and Mary Beth Tinker's
younger siblings who wore armbands to their elementary school were not plaintiffs in this
case, see id. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting); otherwise, the Supreme Court may have articu-
lated a standard for elementary school students. But see infra text accompanying note 36
(observing the reluctance of the Court to articulate a standard incorporating age).
7 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
8 Id. at 514. In so ruling, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and district
court decisions. Id. The district court had found that the school authorities' actions were
not unreasonable in anticipating a disturbance and regulating classroom discussion and
had dismissed the students' complaint. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 258
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nificanly, the Court stated that a student carries the same constitu-
tional rights during classroom hours and on school property as a
student does outside of school, provided that the student's speech at
school does not "'materially and substantially interfer[e] with the re-
quirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school'
and without colliding with the rights of others."9 If, on the other
hand, the conduct "materially disrupts classwork or involves substan-
tial disorder or invasion of the rights of others," the First Amendment
does not protect such conduct. 10
The Court characterized this case as exemplifying an area where
"students in the exercise of First Amendment rights collide with the
rules of the school authorities."'" Justice Fortas, writing for the major-
ity, focused on the fact that no evidence existed that the students
caused a disturbance, pointing out that the mere fear of a commotion
is not enough to abrogate speech rights. 12 According to Justice For-
tas, "[s] tudents in school as well as out of school are 'persons' under
our Constitution,"' 3 but, importantly, he did not distinguish between
secondary and elementary school students.
1 4
2. Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser and Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier: Public Forum Analysis Now
Plays a Role
Distinguishing Tinker, the Supreme Court in Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser'5 limited a public school student's speech rights.1 6 In
Bethel, the Court examined disciplinary actions taken by a secondary
school against a student who used "an elaborate, graphic, and explicit
sexual metaphor" to describe a fellow student running for office at a
F. Supp. 971, 973 (S.D. Iowa 1966). The district court admitted, however, that the stu-
dents' actions were symbolic acts within the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
See id. at 972. A divided Eighth Circuit, hearing the case en banc, affirmed the district
court's decision without opinion. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 383 F.2d
988, 988 (8th Cir. 1967) (en banc).
9 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
10 Id.
11 Id. at 507.
12 Id. at 508-09. Justice Hugo Black disagreed, stating that although student reac-
tions were not loud, violent, or profane, there were strong student reactions to the arm-
bands, including a disturbance that occurred during Mary Beth Tinker's math class. See id.
at 517-18 (Black, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 511.
14 Notably, Justice Potter Stewart, in his concurring opinion, disagreed with the
Court's assumption that children and adults share the same First Amendment rights, see id.
at 514-15 (Stewart, J., concurring), which suggests that he may have dissented if the stu-
dents were younger and not nearing the age of adulthood.
15 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
16 See id. at 685-86.
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school assembly.' 7 In upholding the school district's actions against
the student, the Court explicitly held that public school students do
not possess the same constitutional rights as adults in all instances.1 8
The Court distinguished this case from Tinker on the basis that the
content of the speech was sexual instead of political, thus subjecting
the speech to the Court's obscenity jurisprudence, which "has ac-
knowledged limitations on the otherwise absolute interest of the
speaker in reaching an unlimited audience where the speech is sexu-
ally explicit and the audience may include children."' 9 In considering
the type of speech the Court also added more discretion to the Tinker
standard, writing that "[t] he determination of what manner of speech
in the classroom or in school assembly is inappropriate properly rests
with the school board."20 Although Bethel focused on the obscenity of
the student's speech rather than on the fact that it was conducted at a
school assembly in front of a captive audience, 21 the latter fact would
become relevant after Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.
22
Many commentators believed that the Supreme Court's decision
in Bethel represented a step back from Tinker for students' rights, and
the Court's decision in Hazelwood amplified this concern.2 3 In Hazel-
wood, a high school principal exercised prior restraint over a student-
run newspaper and deleted two pages containing articles on teen
pregnancy and the impact of divorce on students. 24 The principal
17 Id. at 677-78.
18 See id. at 682.
19 See id. at 684-85. Unlike Tinker, Bethel appears to extend to both elementary and
secondary school students, because if offensive speech is impermissible among high school
students, then it will most likely be impermissible in the elementary school setting. Cf S.G.
ex rel. A.G. v. Sayreville Bd. of Educ., 333 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding no violation of a
kindergartener's First Amendment rights when the school disciplined him for stating on
the playground that he intended to shoot a teacher, that he was going to kill a classmate,
and that his mother allowed him to bring guns to school).
20 Id. at 683.
21 Id. at 677.
22 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
23 See, e.g., Ralph D. Mawdsley & Alice L. Mawdsley, Free Expression in Public Schools: A
Trend Toward Greater Control Over Students, 48 EDuc. L. REP. 305, 306, 309-11 (1989) (in-
cluding NewJersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), a school search case, as another case in
which students' rights were limited); Heather K. Lloyd, Injustice in Our Schools: Students'Free
Speech Rights Are Not Being Vigilantly Protected, Note & Comment, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 265,
277 (2001) ("Since the United States Supreme Court passed down the decisions in Fraser
and Hazelwood, United States district courts and circuit courts have followed the Supreme
Court's lead and continued to restrict the First Amendment rights of students."). But see
Jay Alan Sekulow et al., Proposed Guidelines for Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public
Schools, 46 MERCER L. RaV. 1017, 1025 (1995) ("Properly understood, Hazelwood is a narrow
decision having no effect on privately-initiated student speech.").
24 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263-64.
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feared, among other things, that the references to birth control and
sexual activity were inappropriate for younger students. 25
The Supreme Court upheld the school officials' actions.26 The
Court distinguished Hazelwood from Tinker by stating that in Hazelwood,
the question was "whether the First Amendment requires a school af-
firmatively to promote particular student speech."27 In its analysis, the
Court first turned to the question of whether the student-run newspa-
per constituted a public forum, using the standard that school facili-
ties are public forums "only if school authorities have 'by policy or by
practice' opened those facilities for 'indiscriminate use by the general
public' or by some segment of the public, such as student organiza-
tions."28 According to the Court, the newspaper was a classroom activ-
ity, available for school credit, that furthered educational goals within
the educational guidelines and was overseen by a journalism advisor;
thus, the students did not indiscriminately use it and it was not a pub-
lic forum. 29 Under this standard, school officials may regulate the
contents of the paper "so long as their actions are reasonably related
to legitimate pedagogical concerns. '30
Importantly, the Court also highlighted the difference between
the Tinker standard and the public forum analysis: the former involves
speech that happens to occur at school, whereas the latter covers
speech that uses the school's name and resources. 31 The Court added
that this holding was consistent with its policy that parents, teachers,
and school officials-not federal judges-should make decisions re-
garding education. 32 Based on the principal's reasons for exercising
control, the Court held that the principal was reasonable in deleting
the two pages. 3
3
25 See id. at 263. The principal also feared that students would discover the identities
of the pregnant students and that the divorce story did not provide the divorced parents of
named students with a chance to comment. See id.
26 See id. at 276. The district court had upheld the school officials' actions, conclud-
ing that because the school newspaper was "an integral part of the school's educational
function" the standard was not the Tinker disruption standard, but whether "there was a
substantial and reasonable basis for the action taken." Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist.,
607 F. Supp. 1450, 1463 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (quoting Frasca v. Andrews, 463 Supp. 1043, 1052
(E.D.N.Y. 1979)). The Eighth Circuit reversed, finding that the paper was a public forum
and thus, school officials could censor the paper only under the Tinker standard. See
Kuhlmeier v. Hazelwood Sch. Dist., 795 F.2d 1368, 1370, 1374 (8th Cir. 1986).
27 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71 (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
46 n.7, 47 (1983)).
29 See id. at 268-70.
30 Id. at 270, 273.
31 See id. at 272-73.
32 See id. at 273. The Court cited several cases here in support of its proposition;
unsurprisingly, it did not cite Tinker. See id.
33 See id. at 274.
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B. Free Speech in Elementary Schools
Although the Supreme Court has set forth the framework for
evaluating secondary school speech without any express regard for
age, age does play a role. For example, the Hazelwood and Bethel opin-
ions refer several times to the fact that some of the student members
of the audience were younger than others. 34 Taking into account the
students' "emotional maturity," as Hazelwood suggests, also necessitates
a consideration of the students' relative ages. 35 Yet the Court seems
hesitant to articulate an age-based rule, refusing recently to hear a
case involving elementary student speech. 36 Lower courts, on the
other hand, have spoken liberally on the question of age.
1. Third Circuit Cases
The Third Circuit has considered a string of elementary school
speech cases since 1999, starting with C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva.
3 7
When Z.H. was in kindergarten, students made posters for a class pro-
ject depicting what they were thankful for, and Z.H. drew a picture of
Jesus.38 When Z.H.'s teacher placed the poster in the school hallway,
school officials removed it because of its religious theme; the teacher
then restored the poster to the hallway but relocated it to a less promi-
nent spot.3 9 A second incident occurred when Z.H. was in the first
grade and brought a children's Bible stories book to class. 40 Although
Z.H.'s teacher had invited him to bring and read a book to the class as
his reward for reading proficiency, she did not allow him to read his
book to the class.4 1 Z.H.'s mother filed suit alleging that the school
had violated Z.H.'s First Amendment rights on both occasions. 42
The Third Circuit never reached the First Amendment issue, but
instead found a failure to state a claim against the defendants and
34 See id. at 274-75; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677 (1986).
35 See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 ("[A] school must be able to take into account the
emotional maturity of the intended audience in determining whether to disseminate stu-
dent speech on potentially sensitive topics, which might range from the existence of Santa
Claus in an elementary school setting to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high
school setting.").
36 See Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 541 U.S. 936 (2004) (mem.).
37 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
38 See id. at 201.
39 See id. Judge Alito, in his dissent, found that the school's display of the poster was
not a violation of the Establishment Clause. See id. at 212 (Alito, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the Establishment Clause as it relates to student-initiated religious speech, see
infra Part III.B.2.
40 See Oliva, 226 F.3d at 203-04 (Alito, J., dissenting).
41 See id. (Alito, J., dissenting).
42 See id. at 200.
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remanded the case to allow the plaintiff to amend the complaint. 43
But Judge Samuel Alito, writing for the dissent, did examine the con-
stitutional issue, finding that "first, even in a 'closed forum,' govern-
mental 'viewpoint discrimination' must satisfy strict scrutiny and,
second, disfavoring speech because of its religious nature is viewpoint
discrimination. ' 44 Thus, the dissent would have remanded the case
for a determination of whether the school discriminated against Z.H.
due to his poster's religious content.45 In its evaluation, the dissent
applied Tinker, as well as cases more specific to viewpoint neutrality in
schools.
4 6
In 2003, the Third Circuit considered Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg
Harbor Township Board of Education.47 Daniel Walz, a pre-kindergarten
student in a public elementary school, gave out 'Jesus [Loves] The
Little Children" pencils at a school spring holiday party. 48 Daniel's
teacher took the pencils from the students, and the superintendent
agreed with her decision to do so. 49 Soon afterward, the school dis-
trict adopted a written policy on recognition of religion and also
maintained an unwritten policy on student expression, which pro-
vided that "'items with political, commercial, or religious references
were not allowed to be distributed in class during school hours.'"5
0
The next year, in kindergarten, Daniel brought candy canes and a
religious story describing the history of the candy canes to his class-
mates for their winter holiday party.51 The school prohibited Daniel
from distributing the candy canes during the party, but allowed him
to give them before or after class in a hallway outside the classroom,
which he did.5 2 Later, when Daniel was in first grade, he was required
to distribute the canes in the same manner.53 Daniel brought suit
through his mother, alleging that the school's denial of his right to
distribute the pencils and candy canes at the holiday parties violated
his First Amendment rights of freedom of expression and free exer-
cise of religion, and his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
43 See 226 F.3d at 202-03. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, see Hood v. Medford
Twp. Bd. of Educ., 533 U.S. 915 (2001)(mem.), and Z.H.'s mother apparently did not
pursue the lawsuit any further.
44 Oliva, 226 F.3d at 210 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also infra Part III.B.2 (describing
viewpoint neutrality and its place in the discussion of student religious speech).
45 See Oliva, 226 F.3d at 214 (Alito, J., dissenting).
46 See id. at 211-12 (Alito, J., dissenting).
47 342 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 936 (2004) (mem.).
48 See id. at 273.
49 See id.
50 Id.
51 See id. at 273-74.
52 See id. at 274.
53 See id.
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Amendment. 54 The district court granted summary judgment for the
school,55 and Daniel appealed to the Third Circuit.
56
In affirming the district court's decision, the Third Circuit spoke
broadly about the right to limit speech in elementary schools, citing
another Third Circuit case, Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard.
57
Walker-Serrano involved a third-grade student whose elementary school
forced her to stop circulating a petition objecting to an upcoming
field trip to the circus.5 8 The child and her parents sued the school
district for violating her First Amendment rights, and the Third Cir-
cuit ruled for the school district.59 Although the court professed to
apply Tinker,60 in fact it applied a strange "Tinker-plus" standard that
considered several factors, including the age of the students hearing
the speech, 6 1 whether the young listener was capable of compre-
hending the advocated position, whether the young petitioner was
carrying out her parents' views, the school's parental role, and the
possibility of coercion of other students.
6 2
The Walz court echoed the Walker-Serrano court, noting that "age
and context are key" and that "the younger the students, the more
control a school may exercise. '63 The court listed several important
factors in determining whether student expression is appropriate, "in-
cluding the type of speech, the age of the locutor and audience, the
school's control over the activity in which the expression occurs, and
whether the school solicits individual views from students during the
activity. ' 64 The majority added that religious speech is sometimes ap-
propriate in a school setting, such as when a teacher solicits individual
54 Id. The district court and the Third Circuit noted their disbelief that Daniel per-
sonally initiated the handing out of the items, pointing out that Daniel was only four-and-a-
half years old when he tried to distribute the pencils, and so most likely his mother insti-
gated the action. See id. at 275. Both courts, however, suspended their disbelief in evaluat-
ing the constitutionality of Daniel's claim. See id.
55 Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 187 F. Supp. 2d 232, 233 (D.N.J.
2002).
56 Walz, 342 F.3d at 271.
57 See id. at 275 n.2 (citing Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412 (3d
Cir. 2003)). Note that CircuitJudge AnthonyJ. Scirica wrote the majority opinion for both
cases.
58 See Walker-Serrano, 325 F.3d at 414. The school did allow the student to pass out
coloring books and stickers informing her classmates about animal cruelty. See id.
59 See id. at 419-20.
60 See id. at 417.
61 See id. at 416-17. The court reasoned, "[A]t a certain point, a school child is so
young that it might reasonably be presumed the First Amendment does not protect the
kind of speech at issue here. Where that point falls is subject to reasonable debate." Id. at
417.
62 See id. at 418.
63 Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 275-76 (3d Cir.
2003).
64 Id. at 278.
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student expression during show-and-tell, but that religious speech is
inappropriate if it is completely unrelated to the assignment.
65
The court then extended its reasoning, comparing the student's
actions to the newspaper in Hazelwood, because both related to a
school-sponsored activity.6 6 Believing that the line between allowable
speech and school-endorsed speech is blurry for younger students, the
court asserted that school officials' discretion is important and de-
serves deference. 67 The court then stated that "where an elementary
school's purpose in restricting student speech within an organized and
structured educational activity is reasonably directed towards preserv-
ing its educational goals, we will ordinarily defer to the school's
judgment."68
2. Seventh Circuit Cases
The Seventh Circuit has also spoken on the issue of elementary
student-initiated religious free speech. In Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jeffer-
son Lighthouse School, Andrew Muller, an elementary school student,
wanted to hand out fliers inviting fellow students to meetings at his
church, but the school authorities denied him the right to do so.
69
The Seventh Circuit began its discussion by comparing two conflicting
educational concepts in First Amendment cases: the traditional ap-
proach, where "the school's authority can exceed a student's free
speech rights," and the idea that a school is a "marketplace of ideas"
where free speech is important. 70 The court wrote that the "market-
place of ideas" was "a less appropriate description of an elementary
school." 71 Further, the court noted that the Supreme Court has never
extended Tinker to an elementary school setting and observed that it is
unlikely Tinker and later decisions following its analysis apply to public
elementary students. However, the court assumed in its analysis that
65 See id. (providing a math assignment as an example of when religious speech would
be inappropriate). In further illustrating this point, the court also cited a classroom mock
debate as an example of an activity where religious speech would be permissible and an
essay on a great American poet as an example of an activity where religious speech would
be unrelated to the assignment. See id. The court's use of the mock debate and the essay
on a great American poet-activities that are fairly uncommon at a public elementary
school-is a strong illustration of the courtroom-classroom gap. See infra Part II.B.
66 See id. at 277.
67 See id.
68 Id. at 277-78 (emphasis added).
69 See Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1532-33 (7th
Cir. 1996). According to the school, "[the principal] told Andrew that he could not dis-
tribute the ... fliers to his class because they were neither school-supported nor directly
related to school programs." Id.
70 Id. at 1535.
71 Id. at 1538.
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public elementary students do have some of the speech rights in those
cases. 7
2
The Seventh Circuit court then conducted a Hazelwood analysis
and found that per its prior holding, a public elementary school is a
nonpublic forum. 73 Thus, schools may reasonably regulate speech to
further pedagogical interests, so long as the schools do not regulate
speech solely because it is religious.74 In this instance, the Seventh
Circuit upheld the school's code, which authorized prior restraint,
screening for content, and time and place restrictions for literature
distribution.
75
3. District Court Cases
At least two district courts have expressly extended Tinker to ele-
mentary school speech. First, in Johnston-Loehner v. O'Brien,76 the dis-
trict court applied the Tinker test when an elementary school
prohibited distribution of religious literature at school without the ap-
proval of the superintendent. 77 Because the school district could not
show that distributing the literature would disrupt the classroom envi-
ronment or interfere with the rights of other students under Tinker,
and because the court viewed the restriction of religious speech as
inhibiting religion, the court ruled that the school district's actions
violated the First Amendment.
78
Second, in Jeglin ex rel. Jeglin v. San Jacinto Unified School District,79
the district court applied Tinker in finding that a high school dress
code banning apparel adorned with any writing or decoration identi-
fying a particular sports team did not violate students' First Amend-
ment rights because of the real possibility of disruptions presented by
clothing associated with gang membership. 80 The court also found,
however, that the elementary and junior high school dress codes, al-
though identical to the high school code, did abridge free speech,
because the school district offered no evidence that similar disrup-
tions might occur in those settings.81
72 See id. at 1539.
73 See id. at 1539-40 (citing Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d
1295, 1302 (7th Cir. 1993)).
74 See id. at 1545. The lower court had determined the issue of whether the school
district could suppress Andrew's speech solely because it was religious, and the defendants
did not appeal. See id.
75 See id. at 1534 n.2, 1545.
76 859 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1994).
77 See id. at 577.
78 See id. at 579-81.
79 827 F. Supp. 1459 (C.D. Cal. 1993).





WHY AGE MATTERS: How THE COURTROOM-CLASSROOM GAP
Is EXACERBATED IN ELEMENTARY SPEECH CASES
A. Reasons to Treat Younger Students Differently Under the
Constitution
Perhaps the Supreme Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District did not specifically include age as a factor
8 2
because the parties in question were older students and the Court
considered them to have the same First Amendment rights as adults.
8 3
As some scholars have observed, nowhere does the Constitution indi-
cate that children possess different free speech rights than adults.
8 4
Nevertheless, other commentators have suggested that children pos-
sess fewer or different rights from adults, arguing the following: the
Framers did not intend the First Amendment to include children;
8 5
children are too young to fully exercise First Amendment rights;8 6 re-
strictions on these rights are necessary for the state to safeguard the
child's future rights;8 7 and fewer rights are warranted to protect the
parents' authority over the child.
8 8
Yet even if one assumes that children do not have the same free
speech rights as adults, no clear line exists between childhood and
82 But cf Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 417 (3d Cir. 2003)
(arguing that "Tinker provides a flexible standard that arguably is able to incorporate [age]
considerations"); Sekulow et al., supra note 23, at 1072 (asserting that "the Tinker standard
is flexible enough to account for the differences in maturity between elementary school
and older children").
83 See Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir.
1996).
84 See, e.g., David Moshman, Children's Intellectual Rights: A First Amendment Analysis, in
CHILDREN'S INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 25, 31 (David Moshman ed., 1986); Sekulow et al., supra
note 23, at 1072.
85 See Moshman, supra note 84, at 31 ("It might be argued that, although the literal
language of the First Amendment encompasses all people, the writers did not have chil-
dren in mind. It is equally true, however, that they were not considering women or blacks
either.").
86 See Amy Gutmann, What Is the Value of Free Speech for Students?, 29 ARiz. ST. LJ. 519,
523, 528 (1997); Sekulow et al., supra note 23, at 1072; Susannah Barton Tobin, Divining
Hazelwood: The Need for a Viewpoint Neutrality Requirement in School Speech Cases, 39 HARv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 217, 242-43 (2004) (noting that the Supreme Court seems to feel that
students, in general, need the school to act as a screen because they cannot themselves
distinguish between "good" and "bad" speech).
87 SeeJohn H. Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REV. 321, 327 (1979)
("We are interested in safeguarding the chance of the future adult to enjoy rights and
liberties, opportunities and powers, and wealth and sense of self-worth equal to those
shared by currently mature members of society.").
88 See Brian A. Freeman, The Supreme Court and First Amendment Rights of Students in the
Public School Classroom: A Proposed Model of Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 28 (Fall
1984) (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
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adulthood.8 9 As the Supreme Court noted in Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth,90 "[c]onstitutional rights do not mature
and come into being magically only when one attains the state-defined
age of majority."9 1 One suggestion for dealing with this transitional
period between childhood and adulthood is to use a sliding scale
whereby courts would allow children greater freedom of speech as the
children mature and are better able to exercise their rights. 9 2 For
example, children will earn greater rights when the children can dis-
tinguish between arguing for the sake of argument and disagreeing
based on personally held opinions. 93 However appropriate this ap-
proach may be from a constitutional standpoint, the next section will
examine why the speech rights of elementary school children should
turn on the nature of the classroom environment rather than on a
sliding scale of maturity.
B. The Courtroom-Classroom Gap and Its Implications for
Elementary Speech Cases
The long-existing disconnect between the inside of a classroom
and the inside of a courtroom plays an important role in elementary
speech cases and deserves attention. For instance, after Justice Hugo
Black's dissent in Tinker, a school counselor criticized the Tinker ma-
jority in a letter to Justice Black. 94 The counselor wrote, "Maybe if
89 See Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation: A Feminist Approach to Children 's
Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3-4 (1986) (discussing the arbitrariness of defining bound-
aries between childhood and adulthood). Estimates as to where to draw this line vary
wildly. See, e.g., Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 277 (3d
Cir. 2003) (emphasizing that kindergarteners and first graders, in particular, should not
participate in student advocacy); Suzanne Milne Alexander, Note, Too Much Protection and,
at the Same Time, Not Enough: Inconsistent Treatment of Adolescents by the Supreme Court, 53
DEPAUL L. REv. 1739 (2004) (discussing differing assumptions of adulthood used by the
Court in the context of criminal, constitutional, and school rights).
90 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
91 Id. at 74.
92 See Gutmann, supra note 86, at 523, 528. This issue has come up in the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; though the Court has not expressly held that age is a
factor to consider, dicta to that effect appeared in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
583-84 & n.5 (1987). Compare Chelsea Chaffee, Note & Comment, Making a Case for an
Age-Sensitive Establishment Clause Test, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 257, 276-77 (proposing the
adoption of separate standards for children under twelve years old and young adults above
twelve years old), with Deanna N. Pihos, Note, Assuming Maturity Matters: The Limited Reach
of the Establishment Clause at Public Universities, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1349, 1371-76 (2005)
(suggesting that the Supreme Court has overplayed the significance of the age boundary
between high school students and university students in examining prayer at universities,
and that the Court should delve deeper into their "assumption[s] about the audience's
age, maturity and impressionability" before using levels of education to determine the
strictness of the applicable standard).
93 See Gutmann, supra note 86, at 523, 528.
94 SeeJohn W. Johnson, Behind the Scenes in Iowa's Greatest Case: What Is Not in the Offi-
cial Record of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 48 DRAKE L.
Rxv. 473, 487 (2000).
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your fellow Justices could sit where I sit for one day, a reversal of the
present decision would be made." 95 To advance toward a consensus
on the issue of children's free speech rights, one must identify the
basis of this divergence between courtroom and classroom.
At least some of the difference between the federal judiciary's
conception of the public school environment and the viewpoints of
educational professionals and theorists comes from each side's per-
ception of the goals of public schools. For example, the Third Circuit
declared in Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard that "[i]nstilling
appropriate values is a primary goal for our public schools, one that is
especially important in the earlier grades" and added that learning to
behave and to form relationships are additional goals of elementary
school education. 96  Similarly, the Seventh Circuit wrote that
"[g] rammar schools are more about learning, including learning to sit
still and be polite, than about robust debate" 97 and added support
from John Stuart Mill that the principle of a "marketplace of ideas"
applies only to adults.98 A similar characterization of this viewpoint is
that maintaining "calm and civility" in schools is necessary to promote
a cooperative learning environment.99
Yet others characterize the goals of education differently, and
views on the purpose of public education have changed over time.
Historically, the goal of the public school system was to promote re-
publicanism, literacy, and Protestant morality on the theory that for
the republican form of government to flourish, students must learn to
respect it and to participate in it through voting.100 But after the Civil
95 Id. (quoting Letter from Mrs. Marian C. Bentley to Hugo L. Black (Feb. 27, 1969)).
96 Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 417 (3d Cir. 2003).
97 Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir.
1996).
98 Id. at 1538 n.7 (quotingJoHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Currin V. Shields ed.,
1956)); see also Freeman, supra note 88, at 4, 11 (noting that the Supreme Court has only
held that a school is a "marketplace of ideas" in dictum, such as in Tinker). But several
commentators disagree with the Seventh Circuit's view that the concept of a free "market-
place of ideas" does not apply to children. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 86, at 534 ("If
public schools do not teach diverse groups of students the value of dialogue and delibera-
tion-the free and constructive interchange of ideas and understandings about matters of
mutual interest with the aim of resolving our disagreements as reasonably and respectfully
as possible-then what institution in our society will?"); Moshman, supra note 84, at 31-32
("There is substantial evidence that exposure to diverse points of view and encouragement
to form, express, and discuss one's own opinions are crucial to intellectual development."
(citations omitted)).
99 TvuL VAN GEEL, THE COURTS AND AMERICAN EDUCATION LAw 226 (1987).
100 See, e.g., PHILLIP C. SCHLECHTY, SCHOOLS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY. LEADER-
SHIP IMPERATIVES FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM 17 (1990); JOEL SPRING, EDUCATING THE
W ORKER-CITIZEN: THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION
11-13 (1980) (attributing the advent of this idea to Horace Mann's 1848 report to the
Massachusetts Board of Education, in which he proposed teaching republicanism in
schools to eliminate violent political battles and to streamline political discussion within
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War, the view emerged that one of the major purposes of schools was
to assimilate immigrant children into American society.101 As a result,
a perspective emerged that schools should serve as factories to sort
students along different tracks based on their perceived abilities. 10
2
Later, particularly during the Civil Rights Movement, a view emerged
that schools could serve as vehicles for social change such as desegre-
gation. 10 3 Today, many in the education community believe that
schools should serve to eliminate inequality in society through educa-
tion. 10 4 Hallmarks of this viewpoint include filling students' myriad
needs, even if they fall outside the traditional realm of education, in
order to place students of differing socioeconomic statuses on equal
footing.10 5 Finally, the corporate realm has proposed a different ideal
public school system. Rather than focusing on discrete goals and out-
comes, such as achieving a certain level in mathematics or literacy,
corporate leaders have suggested that schools should teach children
how to think, learn, use critical reasoning skills to solve problems, de-
velop creative approaches to problem solving, and work together in
group environments.
10 6
Understanding the judiciary's perception of the purpose of pub-
lic schools is important, because such perception serves as a frame-
work for how the judiciary evaluates student speech rights. This
perception, however, is not easy to apply. For example, in Muller ex
rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse School, the court held that a school
district could restrict student speech to further educational inter-
ests.10 7 If, as the Muller court articulated, the educational interest of
an elementary school is to teach students to "sit still and be polite,"10 8
student speech will be extremely restricted, as it was in that case. 109
On the other hand, if the purpose of school is to address students'
needs, allowing students to discuss their religious heritage could cer-
the republican framework, thus paradoxically promoting a free society by instructing indi-
viduals on how to think).
101 See SCHLECHTY, supra note 100, at 17.
102 See id. at 17, 22-23 (noting that frequently, students' tracking is based on socioeco-
nomic status). According to this view, less capable students move along a vocational track
while gifted students take advanced courses and continue on to higher education. See id.
103 See id. at 18; Bruce C. Hafen, Comment, Hazelwood School District and the Role of
First Amendment Institutions, 1988 DUKE L.J. 685, 704.
104 See SCHLECHTY, supra note 100, at 25.
105 See id. Schlechty cites sex education and cultural awareness as examples of student
needs that schools may fill. See id.
106 See id. at 40-41; see also Harvey Siegel, Critical Thinking as an Intellectual Right, in
CHILDREN'S INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 39 (David Moshman ed., 1986) (arguing that children
have the right to an education focused on the development of critical thinking skills).
107 98 F.3d at 1545 (7th Cir. 1996).
1o8 Id. at 1538.
109 See id. at 1545.
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tainly serve a legitimate pedagogical purpose. 110 Similarly, the court
suggested in Walker-Serrano that schools must focus on instilling appro-
priate values, such as learning to behave.1"1 But the term "appropri-
ate values" could encompass a wide range of ideals depending on
one's own views as to which values public education should stress.
1 12
Given the ambiguity in these judicial standards and the fact that
judges often misconstrue the nature of the classroom environment,
educators struggle to both follow the law and achieve their own goals
for students.
Furthering the gap between the federal judiciary's view on stu-
dents' free speech rights and reality are the fundamental differences
between the nature of elementary school education and secondary ed-
ucation. Although values inculcation' 13 is an integral part of the en-
tire public education system, values inculcation starts at the
elementary school level.' 14 Typical elementary social, political, and
economic inculcative measures include saluting the flag, participating
in crime and drug abuse prevention programs, and lining up for
class.11 5 Although all of these activities continue throughout high
school, they are initially taught and focused on in elementary school.
Bearing this in mind, a further examination of Tinker is appropri-
ate. Elementary students wearing black armbands would not elicit a
disturbance in school because young students would not comprehend
the black armband as political speech and would miss its deeper
meaning; thus, it should pass the Tinker disruption test. Yet many ele-
mentary educators would want to suppress the speech as out of line
with their goals because the idea of political dissent-or any dissent --
clashes with the focus of elementary schools on political inculcation
and respect for government. 11 6
Another example of the courtroom-classroom disconnect relates
to the idea that speech restrictions can exist to protect students from
110 See SCHLECHTY, supra note 100, at 55.
11 325 F.3d at 417 (3d Cir. 2003).
112 But seeJonathan Pyle, Comment, Speech in Public Schools: Different Context or Different
Rights?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 586, 609 (2002) (arguing that the values elementary school
students learn are basic and completely uncontroversial).
113 Values inculcation occurs when a school or other institution "convey[s] predeter-
mined societal values as part of the educational process." Martin A. Redish & Kevin Fin-
nerty, What Did You Learn in School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the Democratic-
Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 62, 84 (2002).
114 Cf David A. Diamond, The First Amendment and Public Schools: The Case Against Judi-
cial Intervention, 59 TEX. L. REv. 477, 498-99 (1981) ("Value inculcation ... has been the
tradition of public education since the beginning of the American republic."); Redish &
Finnerty, supra note 113, at 64-65 (describing inculcative measures instilled throughout
public schooling at all levels).
115 See generally SPRING, supra note 100, at 6-23.
116 See id. at 11-16; Diamond, supra note 114, at 498.
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psychological harm. 117 Setting aside more obvious psychological
harms, such as the sexual language scenarios presented in Bethel School
District No. 403 v. Fraser or insulting language, younger students are
more sensitive than older students on many issues. These sensitivities
are the reason that many elementary schools strive to provide an in-
clusive and non-differentiated environment.'"8 For instance, a poster
depicting Jesus as what a child is thankful for, like the poster at issue
in C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v. Oliva,119 would not likely cause a physical dis-
ruption at any age. Nevertheless, because elementary school is the
first time many children are exposed to community members outside
of their own demographic, such a poster could make some students
feel different or unwelcome and thereby interrupt the learning envi-
ronment for them. In contrast, older students deal more regularly
with differentiation as they transition to adulthood, and thus become
accustomed to dissimilarities between their peers and themselves. 120
Thus, given its singular focus on disruption at the expense of
other issues like social and political inculcation and psychological
harm, Tinker presents more problems for elementary school students
than it does for secondary school students who are closer to adult-
hood. The vast difference between elementary and secondary school
environments and goals suggests that courts should consider a variety
of pedagogical factors when evaluating the speech rights of elemen-
tary school students rather than relying on a judge-made sliding scale
of maturity.
III
POSSIBLE STANDARDS FOR THE SUPREME COURT TO ADOPT
A. Tinker Extended
Although the Supreme Court has yet to apply Tinker to a case
involving elementary school students, the Court could so extend the
standard without difficulty. Despite the Tinker court's omission of age
considerations in the applicable standard, some commentators and
judges believe that the disruption test is flexible enough to accommo-
date various ages. 12' The age difference may result in more suppres-
117 Diamond, supra note 114, at 503-05.
118 See SCHLECHTV, supra note 100, at 25.
119 See 226 F.3d 198, 201 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
120 This is consistent withJean Piaget's final phase of cognitive development, the phase
of formal operations, which occurs from ages eleven to fifteen. See HENRY W. MAIER, THREE
THEORIES OF CHILD DEVELOPMENT 64 (3d ed. 1978). In this phase, "[t]he young acquire
the capacity to think and to reason beyond their own experiences and their own belief
systems." Id
121 See, e.g., Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 417 (3d Cir. 2003);
Chad Allred, Guarding the Treasure: Protection of Student Religious Speech in the Classroom, 22
SEArrLE U. L. REV. 741, 756-60 (1999) (suggesting that the Tinker standard is flexible
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sion of speech at the elementary level because younger children are
more easily disrupted. 122 On the other hand, extending Tinker at least
grants elementary students some constitutional rights, because school
officials must show an actual or impending disruption before sup-
pressing speech. 123 This requirement may cause school officials to
suppress less speech at the elementary level, although more speech
will ultimately be suppressed at the elementary level than at the high
school level.
12 4
Another benefit of Tinker is its familiarity. After enjoying more
than forty years as a preeminent free speech case, many school offi-
cials are familiar with the doctrine and rely on its application. 125 In-
deed, some lower courts already apply many aspects of Tinker in the
elementary school context.1 26
Yet the benefits of Tinker fail to outweigh Tinkers main drawback:
that school officials lack discretion in deciding whether to limit
speech. 127 In his dissent, Justice Hugo Black wrote that "the Court
arrogates to itself, rather than to the State's elected officials charged
with running the schools, the decision as to which school disciplinary
regulations are 'reasonable.' "' 128 Justice John Marshall Harlan also
wrote in his dissent that he believed the standard set forth by the ma-
jority was not adequately framed so as to allow school officials suffi-
cient discretion, and that the standard should instead require a
showing by the plaintiff that the school's action was not motivated by
"legitimate school concerns." 129 This was a shift from previous juris-
prudence, which afforded substantially more deference to school ad-
enough to apply in the elementary school context and advocating its adoption); Sekulow et
al., supra note 23, at 1072 (arguing in favor of extending the Tinker standard to elementary
schools because elementary students do enjoy constitutional protection of their rights and
the Tinkerstandard is flexible enough to accommodate the differences in maturity between
the students).
122 See Sekulow et al., supra note 23, at 1072.
123 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1969).
124 See Sekulow et al., supra note 23, at 1072.
125 See MARK G. YUDOF ET AL., EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAw 225 (4th ed. 2002)
(arguing that this familiarity by school officials has led to a decline in student speech
cases).
126 See, e.g., Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 417 (3d Cir. 2003)
("At the very least, anything that interferes with the legitimate educational and disciplinary
functions of elementary schools could be regulated under Tinker."); C.H. ex rel. Z.H. v.
Oliva, 226 F.3d 198, 211-12 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Alito, J., dissenting); Johnston-
Loehner v. O'Brien, 859 F. Supp. 575, 579-80 (M.D. Fla. 1994);Jeglin ex reL Jeglin v. San
Jacinto Unified Sch. Dist., 827 F. Supp. 1459, 1461-62 (C.D. Cal. 1993).
127 See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the benefits of discretion.
128 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969) (Black, J.,
dissenting).
129 Id. at 526 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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ministrators and required only a rational basis to uphold the decision
of school administrators.
130
Another criticism of Tinker is its implicit adoption of the idea that
schools serve mainly to promote discipline and good behavior in
young children. 131 Under Tinker, the court examines whether the stu-
dent's speech caused a disturbance in school; therefore, if other stu-
dents hear the speech but continue to behave, or "sit still and be
polite," the speech would be acceptable. Particularly in elementary
school classrooms, where young students may frequently participate in
active play or collaborative activities, the standard is likely to be very
difficult for educators to apply. At this age, disruptive behavior may
have less to do with a listener's perception of the speaker's language
than with the listener's own inability "to sit still and be polite."1 32 Judi-
cial misunderstandings of child development exemplify the court-
room-classroom gap and result in unnecessary suppression of
speech.133 Furthermore, it is often difficult to detect a disruption in
any classroom; the disruption may be mental or emotional rather than
physical, rendering the disruption more difficult for the judiciary to
evaluate.1
34
The first step in eliminating this chasm between the courtroom
and the classroom is to eliminate the idea of teachers and administra-
tors as strict disciplinarians. There is no room for judges to interject
their educational or political philosophies in the operative standard
for elementary schools. Courts should instead adopt a standard with
substantially more discretion for educators than the Tinker standard,
so that educators may adapt their actions to meet their classroom
goals rather than try to fulfill the judicial perception of their
purposes.
Thus, Tinker's failure to address the age issue should not be seen
as a mere omission, but as an exclusion of its application to elemen-
130 See Stephen R. Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends in the Law of Student Rights,
118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, 616 (1970) (citing Leonard v. Sch. Comm., 212 N.E.2d 468 (Mass.
1965), wherein the court applied a rational basis test to a school administration's decision
to indefinetely suspend a high school student because his hair was too long, and in so
doing "award[ed] almost absolute deference to the school administration.").
131 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)); Mark G. Yudof, Tinker Tailored: Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression, 69 ST.
JOHN'S L. REV. 365, 367-68 (1995) (presenting justice Abraham Fortas's majority opinion
in Tinker as holding that "the work of the school is indirectly and inextricably linked with
the definition of disruption," while Justice Hugo Black's dissent, on the other hand, viewed
"the whole school enterprise [a]s an instrument of socialization; an instrument for teach-
ing about discipline and disciplinary rules, and about the authority structure within that
school").
132 See Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1538 (7th Cir.
1996).
133 See supra Part II.B.
134 See Diamond, supra note 114, at 485-86, 497.
2006] 1331
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
tary students. Tinker's failure to accommodate educators' discretion is
aggravated by the greater distance between elementary students and
adults than between teenage students and adults and is not appropri-
ate in such a context. Moreover, lower courts' struggles to apply
Tinker, as seen in the next section, suggest that other questions apply
in the elementary context.
B. A Multi-Factor Test Based on Lower Court Opinions
Lower courts in elementary speech cases, responding to gaps in
Tinker, have looked at additional factors to help illuminate the main
issues involved.
1. Extent of Rights
The first issue lower courts have examined is the extent of the
students' constitutional rights, which Tinker granted broadly. Though
courts and commentators alike have frequently noted that elementary
school students possess fewer First Amendment rights, there is no
bright-line explanation of what rights elementary school students pos-
sess.1 35 The Third Circuit's analysis in Walker-Serrano, in reaction to
the lack of instruction from Tinker, discussed what questions to ask to
determine whether young students are capable of exercising their
rights. 136 Such questions include whether the young listeners are ca-
pable of comprehending the advocated position and whether the
young speaker was carrying out her parents' views rather than her
own. 137 These inquiries are helpful in a court's examination of age, as
such inquiries bear directly on whether the student is exercising her
own right to free speech and not serving as a proxy for someone else,
such as a parent.138 Furthermore, these inquiries allow the court to
use a flexible sliding scale, as suggested by one scholar, 39 while still
addressing the roots of the concerns about elementary student
speech.
135 See supra Part II.A.
136 See Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003).
137 See id.
138 See, e.g., Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 275 (3d
Cir. 2003) ("Although we doubt whether the distribution of the pencils constituted
Daniel's own expression ... since we find the school's action in preventing the distribution
of the pencils was justified, this question is not dispositive here."); Hedges v. Wauconda
Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1302 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding that plaintiff, a
junior high student, distributed a religious leaflet "because she agreed with its contents
and wanted to share her religious faith, rather than because she was put up to the job by
officials of the church"); Garvey, supra note 87, at 324 (arguing that "much as we might
decry the imposition of external preferences on mature adults, it is impossible for parents
to avoid imposing their personal preferences on their children").
139 See Gutmann, supra note 86, at 523, 528.
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2. Other Constitutional Analyses: Establishment Clause, Public
Forum, and Viewpoint Discrimination
While older students can easily distinguish between student-initi-
ated speech and school speech endorsing religion, elementary school
children may misinterpret student speech as speech endorsed by the
school. 140  The line between student speech and school-endorsed
speech is difficult to draw when it involves both the Establishment
Clause and the First Amendment;1 4 1 but because Tinker is silent on the
issue, elementary schools warily use the Establishment Clause as an
excuse to suppress speech.1 42 Yet so long as the teacher responds neu-
trally to the speech, many commentators argue that student-initiated
religious speech does not itself violate the Establishment Clause.
143
140 See Wal, 342 F.3d at 277. Compare id. at 275 (noting that kindergarten students did
have the ability to "understand and interpret basic principles of religious expression" and
citing several Establishment Clause cases), with ROBBIE CASE, INTELLECTUAL DEVELOPMENT:
BIRTH TO ADULTHOOD 5 (1985) ("[T]he ability to reason at an abstract level.., appears in
its first preliminary form at around the age of 11 or 12 years."), and Dan Mbulu, First
Amendment: Extending Equal Access to Elementary Education in the Aftermath of Good News Club
v. Milford Central School, 16 REGENT U. L. REv. 91, 111 (2003) (offering expert testimony
of a child psychologist that children would need "some kind of direct explicit statements or
behavior on the part of the endorsing agency" to comprehend a message of religious en-
dorsement). See generally Allred, supra note 121 (discussing the intersection of the Estab-
lishment Clause with elementary speech jurisprudence, and specifically addressing
concerns of compulsory attendance, a classroom's captive audience, and private speech
versus government speech in the classroom); Regina F. Speagle, Comment, Waging War in
America's Classrooms: Recognizing the Religious Rights of Children, 31 CUMB. L. REv. 123 (2000)
(discussing and strongly rejecting the use of the Establishment Clause as a basis for free
speech claims directed at public schools).
141 The Supreme Court has used three separate tests for evaluating Establishment
Clause claims. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court advanced a three-part test for determining
whether state action violates the Establishment Clause: "[f]irst, the [action] must have a
secular ... purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither ad-
vances nor inhibits religion; and finally, the [action] must not foster 'an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)
(citation omitted). Additionally, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor has put forth the endorse-
ment test, where the court asks whether the reasonable observer would view the govern-
ment action as an endorsement of religion. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 69 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Finally, the Supreme Court has also held that coercion sug-
gests government establishment of religion. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
142 See Sekulow et al., supra note 23, at 1056 (noting that "the typical excuse schools
give for censoring student religious speech is that to allow such speech would violate the
Establishment Clause").
143 See, e.g., Sekulow et al., supra note 23, at 1056 (noting, however, that the Supreme
Court decisions so holding only involved universities and high schools); John W. White-
head, Avoiding Religious Apartheid: Affording Equal Treatment for Student-Initiated Religious Ex-
pression in Public Schools, 16 PEPP. L. REv. 229, 237 (1989) (calling the "subjugation" of the
Free Speech and Exercise Clauses to the Establishment Clause an impermissibly inconsis-
tent interpretation of the First Amendment); Graham B. Forrester, Note, A Practical Guide
to the Establishment Clause for Teachers, Principals and Consumers, 6 NExus 257, 268-69 (2001);
cf Tobin, supra note 86, at 251 (advocating that any group student speech, although not
individual student speech, should be examined under both the free speech clause and the
Establishment Clause because of endorsement and coercion problems).
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Some legal scholars additionally argue that even if the school officials
responded to the speech in a way that violated the Establishment
Clause, such as endorsing the religious speech, this does not abrogate
the student's speech rights.14 4  Indeed, the court in Hedges v.
Wauconda Community Unit School District No. 11 8145 harshly criticized a
school district for cautiously prohibiting student speech to avoid any
appearance of Establishment Clause impropriety, writing:
Yet Wauconda [School District] proposes . . . that the best defense
against misunderstanding is censorship. What a lesson Wauconda
proposes to teach its students! Far better to teach them about the
[F]irst [A]mendment, about the difference between private and
public action, about why we tolerate divergent views. Public belief
that the government is partial does not permit the government to
become partial. Students therefore may hand out literature even if
the recipients would misunderstand its provenance. The school's
proper response is to educate the audience rather than squelch the
speaker.146
One must temper the response of the Hedges court, first, with the fact
that the students in that case were in junior high school rather than
elementary school, 1 47 and second, with the viewpoints of other courts,
such as in Brandon v. Board of Education of the Guilderland Central School
District.'4 8 Brandon involved public high school students who wished
to form a student-only prayer group in the morning before school
started.149 In denying the students' suit on Establishment Clause
grounds, the Second Circuit held that "[t]o an impressionable stu-
dent, even the mere appearance of secular involvement in religious
activities might indicate that the state has placed its imprimatur on a
particular religious creed. This symbolic inference is too dangerous
to permit.
' 150
The Hedges and Brandon courts, though they stated opposing view-
points, illustrate the importance of evaluating the impression religious
speech leaves on students. To help determine whether the religious
speech's impression violates the Establishment Clause, the Walz court
posed two questions: First, whether the school solicited individual
views from students during the activity, and second, how much control
144 See, e.g., Sekulow et al., supra note 23, at 1068 (citing Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611
(7th Cir. 1992)) ("Doe stands for the principle that it is not proper to censor protected
private speech to remedy the government's violation of the Establishment Clause,").
145 9 F.3d 1295 (7th Cir. 1992).
146 Id. at 1299.
147 See id. at 1296.
148 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980).
149 See id. at 973.
150 Id. at 978.
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the school exercised over the activity. 151 These questions helped to
determine whether the speech originates with the student or with the
school, and these questions also inform the public forum analysis. In
a situation where the teacher asks all students to share their view-
points, such as in the case of Z.H.'s poster,152 it is more likely than not
that other students understand that the viewpoint comes from the in-
dividual student. In a situation where the student volunteers speech
instead of responding to a solicitation, educators may have other rea-
sons for censoring speech, such as time or relevancy concerns. On
the other hand, the amount of control the school has over the speech
may suggest that the school itself is authorizing the speech. 153 In
Muller, for instance, where students submitted flyers that they wanted
the school to distribute, the court held that it was permissible for the
school to subject the flyers to content-based restrictions and to require
a disclaimer on the flyers if the event was not school-sponsored.
154
The school's likely concern in requiring the disclaimer was to avoid
the appearance of endorsement.
155
As mentioned above, public forum analysis under Hazelwood is
also important. Courts may analyze cases involving student participa-
tion in a classroom activity under Hazelwood, rather than Tinker,
thereby implicating a more restrictive standard and potentially a back
door to more easily restricting speech. 156 For example, the Sixth Cir-
cuit applied the Hazelwood standard in Denooyer v. Merinelli.'57 Denooyer
involved a second-grade program under which students, during an as-
signed week, would present on subjects that were interesting to
them. 158 The plaintiff, a student, wanted to present a video of herself
singing at church. 159 The student's teacher denied the request be-
cause of its religious content, because she felt that the use of a video-
tape would frustrate the purposes of the assignment, and because the
videotape had not been approved by the district, as the district's policy
151 See Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir.
2003).
152 See supra Part I.B.1.
153 Walz, 342 F.3d at 278.
154 See Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1534 n.2, 1545
(7th Cir. 1996).
155 See id. at 1544 ("As an institution of vital public concern, a school has a strong
interest in clarifying to its students and the public what it does or does not endorse.").
156 See Sekulow, supra note 23, at 1030 ("Hazelwood thus indicates that forum analysis is
relevant when analyzing student speech rights where the students' speech is school-spon-
sored .... But it would not be correct to conclude from Hazelwood that all restrictions on
school-sponsored student speech are subject only to the reasonableness standard.").
157 See 12 F.3d 211, 1993 WAIL 477030, at *3 (6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (unpublished
table decision).
158 See id. at *1.




required.1 60  The Sixth Circuit ruled narrowly, finding that the
teacher could regulate the use of videotape, because it was reasonably
related to pedagogical concerns, and declined to address the suppres-
sion of speech because it was religious.
16'
In deciding a free speech case, courts should carefully examine
the particular facts of a case before employing a public forum analysis,
especially if the case involves elementary school students. In situations
where an elementary school student is asked to freely contribute to a
classroom activity, the school has certainly opened itself up to student
speech, and as long as the speech is not actually school sponsored, it
does not fall under Hazelwood.162 The Sixth Circuit decided Denooyer
on less controversial grounds by characterizing the activity as "part of
the curriculum," 163 thus applying the straightforward Hazelwood stan-
dard rather than reaching the more difficult issues that arise through
a Tinker-type analysis.
The interpretation of Hazelwood by some circuit courts to permit
schools to selectively censor viewpoints on a subject raises the separate
issue of whether viewpoint discrimination in public schools is constitu-
tional.'6 4 For example, in Hazelwood, the school principal excluded an
article in the student-run newspaper on teen pregnancy that quoted a
pregnant teen as saying she was happy to have the baby; but previ-
ously, the school had published another article focusing on the nega-
tive aspects of teen pregnancy. 165  This distinction has great
implications for the issue of religious speech, because excluding relig-
ious speech while allowing secular speech may be seen as viewpoint
discrimination.166
Although schools should certainly consider Establishment Clause
concerns and whether the classroom is operating as a public forum,
schools should not overly regulate student religious speech because of
such concerns, and should be cautious about censoring certain view-
points. One approach to allowing student religious speech is to
proactively educate students on the difference between school-spon-
sored and student-initiated speech. 167 As stated by the Hedges court,
160 See id. at *2.
161 See id. at *3.
162 See Allred, supra note 121, at 760-61.
163 See id. at *1.
164 See Tobin, supra note 86, at 232-38 (noting that the First, Third, and Tenth Circuits
interpret Hazelwood as allowing viewpoint discrimination, while the Sixth, Ninth, and Elev-
enth have held that viewpoint discrimination is impermissible).
165 See id. at 226.
166 See id. at 245-46.
167 See, e.g., Allred, supra note 121, at 753-54. The article gives the following example,
drawn from Oliva, of using religious free speech to educate: "Each family chooses what
religion, if any, it will follow. The school doesn't interfere with that. Not everyone believes
what Z.H. believes, but the school doesn't take sides. This story is important to Z.H., and
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"if pupils do not comprehend so simple a lesson, then one wonders
whether... schools can teach anything at all."1 68
3. Situation-Specific Factors
In addition to the factors outlined above, some courts have con-
sidered situation-specific factors. For example, the Walz court looked
at the type of speech at issue.169 The type of speech in the situation
may be particularly important, because some religious speech, particu-
larly if it takes on racist or otherwise hurtful tones, can be detrimental
to the elementary classroom environment.1 70 Teachers and adminis-
trators in elementary school classrooms must be particularly mindful
of this type of speech because of the parental role-in loco parentis-
that the classroom serves for young children. t 7' For example, the
Muller court wrote that while certainly in a public forum, "the Chris-
tian can tell the Jew he is going to hell, or the Jew can tell the Chris-
tian he is not one of God's chosen," this type of speech has no place
whatsoever in the nurturing elementary classroom environment. 17
2
The Walker-Serrano court added that coercion may be a problem
among younger students. 73 Although religious speech was not at is-
sue in Walker-Serrano, it is obvious that such speech could be coercive
to listening students who want to fit in with their classmates, particu-
larly those too young to grasp the concepts behind the speech. 174
whether we agree or disagree with him, we're going to listen to him politely." Id. at 777; see
also David Woodcock, Too Young to Understand? Extending Equal Access to All Children in
Public Schools Regardless of Age, 13 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 491, 517-22 (2001) (suggesting ways
for school officials to ensure that parents and students understand that allowing religious
groups equal access to school facilities is not endorsement of a particular religion).
168 Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir.
1993).
169 Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 278 (3d Cir. 2003).
170 See Muller ex reL Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir.
1996) ("But an elementary school under its custodial responsibilities may restrict such
speech that could crush a child's sense of self-worth."); see also Allred, supra note 121, at
755-57 (noting that while the concept of "fighting words" offers some support for this
proposition, it is outside the scope of Tinker's disruption standard).
171 See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1540-41. The in loco parentis doctrine originated with William
Blackstone, who wrote that the father "may delegate part of his parental authority, during
his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child; who is then in loco parentis, and has such a
portion of the power of the parent ... as may be necessary to answer the purposes for
which he is employed." 1 WILLAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAwS OF ENGLAND
441 (1766). Today, however, the doctrine is disfavored by many courts and commentators
who believe that schools' power to control and discipline children comes from other
sources. See, e.g., Pyle, supra note 112, at 602-03.
172 See Muller, 98 F.3d at 1540.
173 See Walker-Serrano ex rel. Walker v. Leonard, 325 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003).
174 Walker-Serrano's use of coercion is close to the idea of coercion used in the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, specifically in cases involving public school students.
See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992). Coercion is doubly important in the ele-
mentary religious speech context, as both the possibility of religious coercion and the pos-
sibility of speech coercion are present.
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Both situation-specific factors, coercion and appropriateness of the
type of speech, would be best evaluated at the time of the occurrence
by educators present in the classroom.
While the factors outlined above address the problem of the
courtroom-classroom gap under Tinker by identifying important age-
specific questions to ask, the Constitution-based factors (extent of
rights and Establishment Clause, public forum, and viewpoint discrim-
ination analyses) do not afford discretion to education professionals.
In addition, the factors introduce a new problem: Unlike the disrup-
tion test, the multi-factor test is not easily condensable and explaina-
ble to laypersons subject to the law.
C. Deference to Educators
Though Tinker lacked attention to educator discretion, later opin-
ions, such as Hazelwood and Bethel, specifically addressed this concern
and reaffirmed the need for discretion.1 75 In both Hazelwood and
Bethel, the Supreme Court held that the school districts legitimately
restricted the speech at issue. In Hazelwood, the Court achieved this
result by adopting a standard similar to Justice John Marshall Harlan's
school-friendly dissent in Tinker "[E]ducators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical con-
cerns."1 76 Similarly, the Walz court inserted a substantial amount of
discretion into their evaluation, using a Hazelwood-type analysis:
Determining the appropriate boundaries of student expression is
better handled by those charged with educating our youth. School
officials who exercise judgment based on their expertise and au-
thority should be afforded leeway in making choices designed to
foster an appropriate learning environment and further the educa-
tional process .... Accordingly, where an elementary school's pur-
pose in restricting student speech within an organized and
structured educational activity is reasonably directed towards pre-
serving its educational goals, we will ordinarily defer to the school's
judgment. 177
175 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) ("[T]he education
of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local
school officials, and not of federal judges."); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S.
675, 686 (1986).
176 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
177 Walz ex rel. Walz v. Egg Harbor Twp. Bd. of Educ., 342 F.3d 271, 277-78 (3d Cir.
2003). Although the Walz court almost immediately shifts to using a variety of factors to
evaluate the school's conduct, it does return to its original point, finding that the school's
actions were necessary to stop behavior which interfered with the school's educational
goal. See id. at 278-80.
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As articulated by another court, the judiciary's role is only to deter-
mine "whether school officials had a 'substantial basis' for their fear of
significant harm to students."
1 78
Educator discretion is advantageous, because it recognizes the
impracticality of implementing a rule restricting religious speech in a
classroom of five-year-olds. For example, the Walz court suggested
that religious speech may be appropriate if made in response to the
school's solicitation of personal input, such as during show-and-tell.1 79
However, elementary schools do not operate under a draconian sys-
tem whereby students are allowed to volunteer only if it is to share a
favorite toy with the class or similar circumstances. Many activities in
the classroom involve student input and may result in a potentially
religious response. For the youngest children, at least, it is impractical
for teachers to formulate extensive rules as to which questions are ap-
propriate for responses that incorporate personal religion. Because
elementary teachers do not have the forewarning that the school offi-
cials in Tinker did, it may be preferable to allow teachers to preemp-
tively censor religious speech even if there is only the fear of a
disturbance simply because the teacher may not know what will
result.180
Conversely, although the court in Muller warned of "speech that
could crush a child's sense of self-worth" and advocated the need for
its restriction,18' the court failed to consider another type of speech
that could crush a child's sense of self-worth: suppression of the
child's personal expression by a figure crucial to their learning pro-
cess.182 For example, not only did Z.H.'s teacher relocate his artwork
in the school hallway to a less prominent position, but on a separate
occasion, his teacher denied his participation in a reward activity de-
signed to motivate reading proficiency. 183 Indeed, educators should
be concerned that if they prevent a child from participating in a class-
room activity simply because his or her answer may be religious, the
relationship between teacher and child and the child's disposition to
learning will deteriorate as a result. While a child may not be able to
understand the complexities of the First Amendment, a child may eas-
ily discern when he or she receives treatment that differs from that of
178 Diamond, supra note 114, at 495 (citing Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1977)).
179 See Walz, 342 F.3d at 278.
180 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508-09.
181 Muller ex rel. Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1540 (7th Cir.
1996).
182 See MARIO M. MONTESSORI, JR., EDUCATION FOR HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: UNDERSTAND-
ING MONTESSORi 27 (1976).




another student. Thus, it is important that teachers use their discre-
tion and take into account individual factors such as the child's tem-
perament before formulating the teacher's response. A balance of
these factors should guide a teacher in deciding whether to allow the
speech.
One potential drawback of educator discretion is that school offi-
cials, knowing their decision will be given latitude, will choose to cen-
sor student speech to avoid potential Establishment Clause
problems. 18 4 Another major drawback to affording more discretion is
that it might irritate the relationship between parents and the school,
as both compete for influence over the child. 185 However, because a
discretionary standard alleviates the problem of the classroom-court-
room gap in ideology, as well as the practical difficulties and relational
problems with the Tinker rule, it is a better solution than extending
Tinker so long as educators are mindful of students' First Amendment
rights.
CONCLUSION
The elementary school classroom presents a unique environment
to test the parameters of the First Amendment. Importing standards
developed in other distinct contexts raises problems when forced onto
elementary schools. Thus, the Tinker standard, focused exclusively on
whether a student's speech creates a disruption and designed to pro-
tect the speech of near-adults, is an utter failure in the elementary
setting, where more factors should inform the decision. The Supreme
Court, if it ever chooses to address whether to extend Tinker to the
elementary classroom, should be mindful both of the approaches of
the lower courts and the benefits of discretion. Specifically, the stan-
dard should allow education professionals discretion to make class-
room- and situation-specific decisions, but must also allow courts,
necessarily evaluating the situation post hoc, to consider both the age
and maturity of the students and the intersection of student speech
rights and other constitutional principles to ensure the exercise of dis-
cretion comports with student speech jurisprudence. Most impor-
tantly, a new standard for evaluating students' rights to free speech in
184 See, e.g., Hedges v. Wauconda Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 118, 9 F.3d 1295, 1299 (7th
Cir. 1993) ("School districts seeking an easy way out try to suppress private speech. Then
they need not cope with the misconception that whatever speech the school permits, it
espouses."); Chemerinsky, supra note 5, at 535 (characterizing Justice Black's view in Tinker
as "one of minimal protection of students' speech in schools: courts must defer to the
expertise and authority of school officials"); Sekulow et al., supra note 23, at 1018 (noting
that school officials often censor religious speech more than secular speech).
185 But as one commentator has noted, judges often serve to settle the competing in-
terests of parents and the state. See Robert A. Burt, Developing Constitutional Rights Of In,
and For Children, 39 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 118, 132 (Summer 1975).
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elementary school classrooms must comport with a reasonable con-
ception of the goals and purpose of U.S. elementary schools. This
conception must recognize that each classroom is unique and that ele-
mentary schools are places where children learn not only from teach-
ers but from the diverse backgrounds and views of other students.
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